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provided that this copyright notice appears on all such copies.Agricultural Bank Efficiency and the Role of Managerial Risk Preferences
Abstract
We investigate the objectives of agricultural bank managers and evaluate bank efficiency. 
If managers are concerned about risk, then their preferences should be considered when
evaluating bank performance.  We find risk-averse managerial behavior and efficiency
gains due to bank size, market competition, risk-reduction, and less risk exposure of
outputs. 1
Agricultural Bank Efficiency and the Role of Managerial Risk Preferences
The period from 1986 to 1996 has been noted as one of a decline in banking.  Pare ￿
(1995) asserted in Fortune magazine that banks are going the way of the dinosaur and that
most bankers are “clueless” when it comes to survival strategies.  The common opinion is
that banks are losing out to a wide range of nonbank competitors such as finance
companies, mutual funds, and private pension funds that are offering traditional types of
banking products more efficiently.  Kohl (1989) noted that a sizeable portion of the
lending market was being controlled by non-traditional credit sources.
Accompanying this decline was a wave of bank consolidations and mergers fueled
by the lifting of restrictions on interstate banking and intrastate branching.  In 1994, the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 was adopted by
Congress.  This legislation removed all barriers to interstate banking and branching.  
Policy analysts and state legislators continue to debate the effects of these
provisions on banks in their states.  The Independent Bankers Association of America
states that “interstate branching is bad public policy; it provides no benefits for community
bankers; and it is little more than special interest legislation to allow our nation’s biggest
banks to consolidate their empires.”  Proponents of the Riegle-Neal Act advocate that
removing interstate banking and branching restrictions would result in the entry of more
efficient banks into local markets.  Joe Brannen, president of the Georgia Bankers
Association, said that “the Riegle-Neal gives our banks that are going to be operating
across the country access to higher lending rates.” 2
The main objective of this research is to evaluate efficiency in Georgia agricultural
banks.  The risk-preferences of bank managers will be investigated to accurately measure
agricultural bank efficiency.  The second objective is to estimate scale economies of
agricultural banks.  The research results will provide information about the optimal bank
size and potential economic benefits of consolidation among agricultural banks.  The third
objective is to evaluate the effects of firm and market characteristics on agricultural bank
efficiency.  This information will provide insights regarding the influence of deregulation,
mergers, and market structure on efficiency. 
Agricultural Bank Risk and Risk Management
Agricultural financial contracts typically involve future cash flows.  The inherently
risky nature of future flows justifies the need to consider risk when evaluating agricultural
bank efficiency.  Industry professionals have identified the importance of risk management
in the viability of a bank.  Zaik et al. (1996) note that banks have invested heavily in risk-
management systems since 1985 to assess risks their businesses face.   Agricultural
banks face three major sources of risk.  First, default risk arises when borrowers cannot
repay their loans and accrued interest.  Second, liquidity risk derives from the uncertainty
about banks’ abilities to maintain enough funds to meet customers’ loan demands.  Third,
interest rate risk is the hazard of banks refinancing their long-term loans at interest rates
above the rates they receive.
   These specific risks create variability in the cash flows of agricultural banks. 
Excessive risk taking coupled with adverse economic conditions may lead to bank failure. 3
Managers concerned about risk engage in hedging activities and maintain high levels of
liquid assets in the form of financial capital to provide a cushion against any losses.
We focus on the use of financial capital by bank managers in controlling risk. 
Financial capital or equity is the dollar amount of capital provided by stockholders in the
bank.  The amount of equity held by a bank is vital in ascertaining the level of risk in a
given loan portfolio.  Bank capital levels provide a cushion for loan losses as protection
from insolvency.  The level of equity signals the level of the bank’s riskiness to uninsured
depositors.  Financial capital indicates the extent to which the bank is protected from risk.
Economic Model
For managers concerned about risk, their utility functions contain elements that
reflect their preferences for low risk and high profits.  The aspects of managerial utility are
the risk-free rate of return, r, the amount of nonperforming loans n, the vector of output
prices p, and k, the level of financial capital.  The inputs, x and outputs, y are introduced
because some inputs and outputs may be riskier than others.  If a bank’s outputs are
largely interest-bearing then it exposes the bank to severe levels of risk.  
The bank manager has an ordering of preferences that reflects his or her taste. 
Assuming % % is the real before-tax profit, the decision maker’s preference for expected
profit, conditional on the production plan is characterized by the utility function 
U(%, x; y, p, r, n, k).  We assume that the utility function is quasi-concave and twice
continuously differentiable.  This formulation is general and adapts to various objectives
besides profit maximization. Max%, x U(%, x; y, r, n, k)
s.t. py ￿ m ￿ wx ￿ p%% ￿ 0
T(y, x, n, k) ￿ 0
h(L ￿ S) ￿ k.
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The manager’s problem is to maximize utility with respect to the production plan
and profit levels, conditional on the definition of profits, the technology that specifies the
feasible production plan, and the preferred level of financial capital.  Assume l is the total
amount of loans made and s is the amount of securities purchased.  The manager’s
problem is specified as
Here, m is the level of non-interest income, w is the input price vector, and p
The Generalized Almost Ideal Demand Model
We formulate a model based on bank managers’ utility functions to evaluate their
preferred production technologies and estimate agricultural bank efficiency.  The
econometric model builds on insights provided by Hughes et al. (1997) and generalizes the
Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) to account for generalized managerial preferences. 
The generalized AIDS model modifies the expenditure function E to incorporate
additional elements that impact managerial utility.  Let U be the desired level of
managerial utility and the terms ￿, ￿, ￿, and µ represent parameters to be estimated.  Then











We differentiate E using Shephard’s lemma to obtain the input share and profit
equations that constitute the Almost Ideal Demand System.  The optimal solutions for
inputs x  and profit % %  define the preferred production plan used by the bank manager
*     *
concerned about risk.  The optimal demand for financial capital k  is obtained by
*
maximizing the manager’s utility function with respect to k.  
Testing Managerial Objectives
Three criteria are used in examining the risk-preferences of agricultural bank
managers.  These criteria are based on economic theory and directly impact the parameters
to be estimated in generalized AIDS model.  The first criterion evaluates the effects of the
effective tax rate on the manager’s choice of before-tax profit.  For a bank manager who is
indifferent to risk, a variation in the effective tax rate and in the real value of before-tax
profit, p  will not impact his or her choice of before-tax profit. % %
The second criterion assesses the impacts of the output price vector on the
manager’s cost minimizing plan.  For a risk-neutral manager, the revenue and risk
characteristics of production represented by the output price vector, p will not influence i
the cost minimizing production plan.  Managers who are not concerned about risk base
their decisions on cost minimization solely on input prices and the target output level. 













The third criterion evaluates the impacts of non-interest income, m on the optimal
demands for the inputs x , profit % % , and financial capital, k .  For the risk-neutral
*    *        *
manager, variations in income from sources other than those accounted for by output have
no marginal significance for the optimal input demands, financial capital, and profit. 
Deriving Scale Economies
Scale economies in production provide information about the technology that bank
managers employ in managing resources to maximize utility.  This information helps
determine the optimal size of agricultural bank for efficiently providing credit.
Bank managers concerned about risk pursue activities that present several input
combinations for utility maximizing levels of output.  The most preferred cost, ￿ ￿ c
incorporates the cost of producing outputs accounting for the expenses incurred in
reducing risk.  Risk-reduction yields a measure of scale economies that encompasses
generalized managerial preferences.  The generalized scale economy measure, GSE
incorporates the level of financial capital k and additional expenses incurred by managers
who are concerned about risk.  The GSE shows how variations in bank output levels
impact the cost of production and may be defined as 
Measuring Bank Efficiency With Risk Expected-Return Tradeoff
We estimate a best-practice risk-expected return frontier to assess the efficiency of




it ￿ ￿it ￿ µit ,
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of observed profit from the potential profit that can be achieved at that stipulated level of
risk gives an index of agricultural bank inefficiency. 
Expected return is the predicted profit obtained from the production model.  Risk
is the absolute value of the standard deviation of predicted profit.  We posit that expected
return is a function of the absolute standard deviation of expected return and the variance
of expected return.  A composite term is included to account for the interaction between
the absolute standard deviation and variance.  
Let ER represent an agricultural bank’s expected return and RK be the level of
risk associated with that expected return.  Assume ￿ ￿ is independently and identically
distributed as a random variable with zero mean and variance ) ) .  Suppose µ accounts for ￿ ￿
2
technical inefficiency in production, is independent of ￿ ￿, non-negative, independently and
identically distributed with mean, q and variance, ) ) , and is truncated at 0.  Let the ￿ ￿ s be µ                 i
2
parameters to be estimated.  Then for a sample of i agricultural banks over t periods, the
stochastic efficient production frontier is 
for all i and t.  
The variance and interaction terms capture the shape of the manager’s utility
function.  The shape of the utility function depends on the manager’s attitude toward risk
at various levels of expected return.  The utility function may be linear, concave, or
convex depending on the manager’s risk-preference.






We employ factors perceived as partly exogenous and beyond the immediate
control of the manager to explain differences in inefficiency across banks.  This evaluation
will demonstrate how the characteristics of the Georgia banking market impact
agricultural bank efficiency.  Technical inefficiency effects µ are assumed to be defined by 
The ￿ ￿ s are parameters to be evaluated.  The value of total bank assets, TA is a i
proxy for bank size.  The relationship with bank efficiency reflects the impacts of bank
expansion on performance.  The loan shares, LS and deposit shares, DS of the agricultural
bank serve as proxies for the bank’s market share and characterize the competitive
conditions of the banks’ localities.  The standard deviation of the bank’s return on assets,
SDROA is included as a direct measure of bank risk that is realized in bank earnings.  The
loan to asset ratio, LA and deposit to loan ratio DL are firm-specific characteristics that
influence bank inefficiency.  
Data and Estimation
This research uses data from 1990 to 1995 from Sheshunoff: The Banks of
Georgia.  This annual publication is provided by the Sheshunoff Information Services, a
Texas based company which compiles data obtained from the Consolidated Reports of
Condition and Income.  The 1139 banks included in the sample are Georgia banks that
provided loans to agricultural production over the 1990-1995 sample period. 
Production technology parameters are measured using the iterative three-stage
least squares program in the LIMDEP computer program.  Agricultural bank efficiencies9
are computed using maximum likelihood techniques in the FRONTIER, Version 4.1
(Coelli, 1994) computer program. 
Results and Conclusions
The likelihood ratio test of managerial risk-preferences yields statistics which
indicate that managers of Georgia agricultural banks are concerned about risk.  They
maximize satisfaction by substituting high profit levels with reduced risk. 
Elasticity estimates from the demand for financial capital equation provide insight
into the utility-maximizing behaviors of agricultural bank managers.  The weighted
average input price elasticity of demand for financial capital is -0.09.  The negative
relationship means that financial capital serves as a complement to labor, physical capital,
other borrowed money, insured and uninsured deposits.  Risk-averse managers seek
higher levels of equity to reduce liquidity risk as they acquire more of the cheaper input. 
A positive relationship exists between the demand for equity and the weighted
average price of outputs with an estimated elasticity is 0.06.  Bank levels of financial
capital are positively related to the levels of the outputs.  As output prices and levels rise,
the expected returns increase.  When managers increase their banks’ stocks financial
capital with an increase in expected revenues, they tradeoff higher levels of profit for
lower risk.
The demand for financial capital is positively linked with the level of
nonperforming loans.  Bank managers who are concerned about risk demand higher levels
of financial capital as a cushion against the risk associated with delinquent borrowers.  The
demand for equity rises as the real value of before-tax profit increases.  A similar10
relationship exists with non-interest income.  These relationships demonstrate that Georgia
agricultural bank managers are concerned with risk and substitute higher profits with low
levels of risk.  They employ higher levels of financial capital expected returns increase.
Over the entire asset range, agricultural banks are operating with increasing returns
to scale technologies.  The GSE measure significantly exceeds one so bank costs increase
at a less than proportionate rate than a scaled expansion in outputs.  Banks with assets
below $1 billion are operating at increasing returns to scale while banks with over $1
billion in assets operate at constant returns to scale.  Georgia agricultural banks with
assets less than $1 billion that merge with other banks will experience a more than
proportionate expansion in outputs.  Mergers that result in banks with over $1 billion in
assets do not accrue any scale economies.  Since the largest asset category includes banks
with assets up to $17.5 billion we conclude that the optimal bank size for the efficient
provision of agricultural credit lies between $1 billion and $17.5 billion.
The estimates presented in table 1 show that the banks with assets under $500
million operate with similar technologies.  Banks in the larger asset categories also use
similar production techniques different from those of their smaller bank counterparts.
The signs of the parameters of the expected return-risk frontier obtained illustrate
a concave efficiency frontier.  A one percent increase in risk leads to a 0.01 percent
increase in expected return.  This rate of substitution falls by 0.12 percent per unit increase
in risk.  The concavity of the frontier is consistent with the behavior of a risk-averse
manager whose satisfaction increases at a less-than-proportional rate as income increases.  11
When risk is low, managers who are disinclined toward risk will accept higher
levels of risk for greater expected returns.  As risk increases, they become less inclined to
assume the higher risk accompanying larger expected returns.  Every additional unit of
profit carries a more-than-proportionate level of risk.  The decreasing rate of substitution
between high expected returns and low risk yields a concave efficient frontier.
The efficiency estimate for the entire 1990-1995 sample period is 0.89.  From 1990
to 1995, efficiency declined at an annual rate of 0.1 percent.  The efficient risk-expected
return frontier is determined by best practice banks so managers of inefficient Georgia
agricultural banks were lagging behind the best practice technologies.  Bank efficiency
improved with size, market competition levels, and reduced risk.  Exposing bank outputs
to lower levels of risk also improved bank efficiency.
Banks are exposed to various sources of risk in their businesses.  To control risk,
risk-averse managers engage in activities that deviate from profit maximization.
Considering the risk-preferences of managers is important when evaluating bank
performance.  Models that ignore risk are wrongly specified and lead to wrong
conclusions about bank performance.12
Table 1.  Scale Economy Estimates Distributed Across the Different Bank Sizes
Asset Categories
($ million)
            Mean Standard Error Number of Banks
Under $25 1.0686 0.0296 173
*
$25 to $50 1.0675 0.0495 392
*
$50 to $100 1.0618 0.0254 302
*#
$100 to $500 1.0670 0.0304 236
*
$500 to $1000 1.114 0.0450 6
*#
Over $1000 1.1840 0.1689 30
#
Whole Sample 1.0693 0.0497 1139
*
 Significantly different from 1 at the 90 percent confidence interval.
*
# Significantly different from other category means at 90 percent confidence interval.References
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